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The central coherentist critique of foundationalism brings 
forward a requirement of meta-justification for putative 
basic beliefs, which means that the beliefs are not basic 
after all. The foundationalist response denies this require-
ment, because it is in conflict with the doctrine of super-
venience. Recently, one of the principal members of the 
coherentist camp, Keith Lehrer (1997, 60-77), suggested 
coherentists should reject this doctrine in order to maintain 
their advantage over foundationalist theories of justifica-
tion. 
I will argue that coherentists need not go so far as to 
reject the doctrine of supervenience. The denial of this 
very plausible doctrine would, on the contrary, decrease 
the attractiveness of coherentism. Even if we assume that 
such a doctrine is true, and that justification does not in 
itself require meta-justification, there is still a need for 
meta-justification when we try to determine which beliefs 
really are justified, and what the non-epistemic base is on 
which justification supervenes. I will argue that coher-
entism provides us with a better account of this meta-
justification. In other words, I will argue that the resolution 
of the problem of the criterion requires coherentism, but 
that this sort of meta-epistemic coherentism is in fact 
compatible with epistemic foundationalism. There is room 
for a compromise in the debate between foundationalism 
and coherentism. 
1. The Need for Meta-Justification 
The strongest coherentist critique of foundationalism is 
directed against the possibility of basic beliefs – beliefs 
that are justified independently supporting reasons. It is 
claimed to be irresponsible, dogmatic, or arbitrary to adopt 
beliefs without reasons. Laurence BonJour (1985, 30-33), 
for example, used to argue that, in order to be basic, S's 
belief must have a feature in virtue of which it qualifies as 
basic, and this feature must also constitute a good reason 
for thinking that the belief is true. In other words, there 
must be the following justificatory argument: 
(1) S's belief that p has feature F. 
(2) Beliefs having feature F are highly likely to be true. 
Therefore, S's belief that p is highly likely to be true. 
But it is not enough that this sort of meta-justification exists 
in the abstract. In order to be justified in believing that p, S 
must also believe the premises of the argument and must 
be justified in believing them. This means that S's belief 
that p is not basic after all, because S’s being justified in 
believing that p depends on other justified beliefs. 
The foundationalists respond that such an argument 
violates the doctrine of supervenience, which says that, for 
any justified belief, there must be non-epistemic conditions 
that are sufficient for its being justified. The premises of 
this argument entail that there cannot be such sufficient 
conditions of justification, because all sufficient conditions 
include as a necessary component some justified beliefs 
(Sosa 1991, 183). Therefore, there must be something 
wrong with the argument. Perhaps it is sufficient for 
justification that S’s belief simply has a feature that makes 
it probably true. S need not have additional justified beliefs 
about the matter. This, at least, is the position of a 
reliabilist foundationalist. 
Another line of coherentist critique focuses on epistemic 
principles rather than reliability. It is argued that, in order to 
have justified beliefs, one must be justified in accepting the 
relevant epistemic principles, which implies that there 
cannot be basic beliefs. Yet, once again, this cannot be so 
if the doctrine of supervenience is true. (Van Cleve finds 
such a critique in Sellars and Lehrer. See Van Cleve 1979, 
76.) 
If the doctrine of supervenience is true, there are epis-
temic principles of the form “If ... then S is justified in 
believing that p”, in which the antecedent specifies some 
non-epistemic condition. They say that the obtaining of the 
non-epistemic condition is sufficient for justification. It is 
thus unnecessary for S to be also justified in believing in 
the principle. Neither is it necessary for S to be justified in 
believing that the antecedent obtains. (Van Cleve 1979, 
77-78.) 
William Alston (1989, 153-171) argues that these sorts 
of coherentist critiques suffer from a level confusion. The 
requirement of meta-justification is raised at the wrong 
level. To have a justified belief about non-epistemic 
matters does not require justified beliefs about epistemic 
principles or the obtaining of their antecedents. Yet, to 
have a justified belief that a belief is justified does require 
this. Alston claims that adopting a basic belief is not 
arbitrary, because one can have this sort of inferential 
justification for the higher-level belief that the lower-level 
basic belief is justified.  
Alston accepts one type of meta-epistemic foundation-
alism. There are other types as well. But they should all be 
rejected, because they are unable to solve the problem of 
the criterion – or so I will argue. 
2. The Problem of the Criterion 
The debate between foundationalism and coherentism 
concerns the conditions of justification. Yet, there is also 
the question of which particular beliefs satisfy the 
conditions, and are, therefore, justified. The problem of the 
criterion, as Roderick Chisholm (1982, 61-75) describes it, 
is the problem of how to answer both of the following two 
questions: 
(A)  Which beliefs are justified? What is the extent of 
justified belief? 
(B)  What makes beliefs justified? What are the 
criteria or conditions of justification? 
The problem is that we do not seem to be able to answer 
question A unless we have already answered question B – 
and we do not seem to be able to answer question B 
unless we have already answered question A. So we do 
not seem to be able to answer either question.  
According to Chisholm, there are only two ways of 
avoiding this problem: We answer question A first, and 
then use this answer to figure out the answer to question 
B. Or we answer B first, and then use this answer to figure 
out the answer to A. Chisholm calls the former alternative 




particularism, because in this case we begin with particular 
cases. He calls the latter one methodism, because it 
suggests we start instead from a general method, criterion, 
or principle.  
There are two sides to this problem: one is psychologi-
cal, the other epistemic. The psychological side concerns 
the temporal order in which we arrive at our answers to the 
two previous questions. The particularist strategy is to 
begin with our beliefs (or intuitions) concerning particular 
cases, and then to reason from them to beliefs about 
principles. The methodist one is to start from beliefs (or 
intuitions) about right principles, and then to reason to 
beliefs about particular cases. 
The epistemic side of the problem concerns the justifica-
tion of results. Of course, we do not want the results of our 
epistemological inquiry to be arbitrary. We want results 
that we can be justified in accepting. It seems clear that 
both particularists and methodists would give foundation-
alist answers to this question of meta-justification. Their 
answer to one of Chisholm’s questions is not only causally 
but epistemically dependent on their answer to the other. 
The epistemic order reflects the temporal order of inquiry, 
or at least, this is what I take to be the position of meta-
epistemic foundationalism. 
We can gain a clearer picture of the foundationalist 
structure of meta-justification by distinguishing three kinds 
of beliefs: 
(1)  Beliefs in singular epistemic propositions 
(2)  Beliefs in non-epistemic propositions (including 
beliefs in the antecedents of epistemic princi-
ples) 
(3)  Beliefs in epistemic principles 
Singular epistemic propositions attribute justification to 
singular beliefs. Epistemic principles attribute justification 
to certain kinds of beliefs. And to infer one from the other, 
we need beliefs in the non-epistemic antecedents of 
epistemic principles. The particularist’s suggestion is that 
we infer from 1 and 2 to 3. The methodist, in turn, suggests 
that we infer from 2 and 3 to 1. Let’s assume that these 
inferences are indeed able to transmit justification from the 
premises to the conclusion. The central question remains: 
What justifies the premises? 
If we rule out infinite regresses and circles as incapable 
of providing justification, some the premises must be 
accepted as basic. Both the particularist and the methodist 
may try to avoid postulating basic epistemic beliefs, and to 
derive their epistemic premises from non-epistemic 
propositions. However, this would require there to be 
definitions of epistemic concepts in terms of non-epistemic 
concepts, which may be dubious. Even if there were such 
definitions, they would still take the role of epistemic 
principles, which means that such a derivation cannot after 
all succeed. All such derivations would require some 
epistemic principle as a premise. 
Thus, there seems to be no alternative to regarding 
either epistemic propositions or epistemic principles as 
basic. Coherentists, such as Keith Lehrer (1974, 143-144), 
object to this maneuver, because it makes the choice of 
epistemic premises arbitrary. James Van Cleve (1979, 86), 
who defends foundationalism, complains that this objection 
begs the question. It just presupposes that all justification 
is inferential, and that there cannot be basic beliefs. 
The coherentist objection should be understood differ-
ently. It is not the question-begging claim that there cannot 
be basic epistemic beliefs, because coherentism is true. 
Coherentists may very well accept for the sake of 
argument that there can be such beliefs. They just want to 
raise the question: Which particular epistemic beliefs are 
basic? Foundationalists can hardly avoid this question, 
because these are the beliefs they intend to use as their 
starting point. Yet, when they ask the question, they 
confront the problem of the criterion again – raised on a 
higher level. They may supply a foundationalist response 
to this higher-level problem, but it simply raises the 
problematic on a still higher level, and so forth. There is no 
real way for foundationalists to stop the regress.  
This regress is not the result of level-confusion. It is 
created instead by quite sensible questions about 
ourselves: Which of our beliefs are justified? What makes 
them justified? We may start answering them from what 
we believe about particular instances of justified belief, or 
about the criteria of justified belief. Yet, to avoid arbitrari-
ness, we must first ask the same questions about these 
epistemic beliefs: Are they justified, and what justifies 
them? Yet, when we try to answer these questions, we 
face the same questions again on a higher level, and so 
on ad infinitum. We cannot answer the original questions 
satisfactorily, because this requires that we have already 
answered an infinite number of questions of increasing 
complexity.  
For meta-epistemic foundationalists, the psychological 
starting point of epistemological reflection is the source of 
justification for the resulting epistemology. That is why they 
cannot avoid the question of the arbitrariness of the 
starting point, and once this question is raised, it cannot be 
satisfactorily answered. 
3. Coherentism and Scepticism 
Meta-epistemic coherentism avoids the problem of the 
criterion, because it allows the arbitrariness of its starting 
point. For coherentism, the psychological starting point of 
epistemological reflection is not the source of justification 
for its results. What justifies the results is their mutual 
coherence. The method used is often called the method of 
reflective equilibrium. According to it, we start from 
whichever beliefs we happen to have, and then try to put 
them into a state of reflective equilibrium.  
When we follow this method and try to put our beliefs in 
(1) singular epistemic propositions, (2) non-epistemic 
propositions, and (3) epistemic principles into reflective 
equilibrium, we will most probably end up advocating some 
form of epistemic foundationalism. This is so for the simple 
reason that we lack beliefs about the overall coherence of 
our beliefs. So it is epistemic foundationalism rather than 
epistemic coherentism that should be in a state of 
reflective equilibrium. (See Lammenranta 1986.) 
It is important to notice that the method of reflective 
equilibrium does not require us to have beliefs about the 
overall coherence of our view. Neither does it require that 
we have beliefs that our beliefs are at some point in a state 
of reflective equilibrium. It merely requires us to resolve 
conflicts among our beliefs when they occur. There are no 
guarantees that all of the conflicts will be resolved at some 
point, or that no new beliefs will be in conflict with the ones 
already acquired. It is the open-ended nature of the 
method that stops the level regress.  
Because we are now endorsing two different (and even 
conflicting) theories of justification, we must accept them 
as theories of different concepts or properties. Perhaps it is 
better to say that foundationalism is the best theory of 




epistemic justification, while coherence is the end we hope 
to achieve through philosophical reflection. 
Yet, what does that say about the classical problem of 
coherentism: the multiplicity of incompatible but equally 
coherent systems of beliefs? Coherentism does not 
provide any means for choosing between them. This 
problem disappears when we take coherence itself to be 
the end of epistemological reflection. In so far as we set 
forward truth as the aim, and have realized that our 
methods at best ensure only coherence, we ended up with 
this problem. Yet, now that we have stopped worrying 
about truth and have settled for coherence, we do not 
have the problem any more.  
To be sure, our position is a sceptical one – in the 
traditional Pyrrhonian sense. Having been unable to find 
criteria by which to distinguish truth from error, we 
subsequently settle for appearances. To live by appear-
ances is to be guided by our native and acquired belief-
forming dispositions. To be guided in this way is, among 
other things, to be guided toward revising our beliefs when 
they seem to contradict each other, and to replace less 
plausible beliefs with more plausible ones. It is thus nature 
itself that guides us towards reflective equilibrium and 
coherence.  
In addition, the open-ended character of the method fits 
this brand of scepticism. A sceptic – in the original 
meaning of the word – is an inquirer. As inquirers, we 
should always be ready to revise our view. Our position 
can never be anything other than a provisional one. 
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